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In the last twenty-five years, environmentalists have sought recognition for
the right to a safe environment (RSE) in national and international fora.' As
a result, some countries have recognized RSE in their constitutions.'
Nevertheless, much skepticism exists about whether RSE is a genuine human
right, and advocates of RSE still need to persuade critics that this right merits
national and international recognition. This paper presents a normative
t Professor of Philosophy, University of Colorado, Boulder.
1. On the history of proposals for such a right, see Melissa Thorme, Establishing Environment as a
Human Right, 19 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 301, 303-05 (1991).
2. See EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNEsS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS 297-327 (1989) (listing
provisions from constitutions of Albania, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma,
Canada, Chile, People's Republic of China, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial
Guinea, Ethiopia, Federal Republic of Germany, German Democratic Republic, Greece, Guatemala,
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malta, Mexico,
Netherlands, Nicaragua, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sri
Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab
Emirates, Vanuatu, Vietnam, Yemen, and Yugoslavia). Efforts to introduce an amendment to the U.S.
Constitution creating a right to a safe environment have failed. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 1205, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1970). However, the preamble to the U.S. National Environmental Policy Act sets the goal of
assuring "for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and aesthetically and culturally pleasing
surroundings." National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, § 101(b)(2), 83 Stat.
852, 852 (1970). Richard 0. Brooks has advocated the creation of a right to a healthful environment in
state constitutions in the United States. Richard 0. Brooks, A Constitutional Right to a Healthful
Environment, 16 VT. L. REV. 1063 (1992).
3. The right to a safe environment has not been subjected to extended philosophical examination and
debate in the way that economic and social rights have. W. Paul Gormley provided ai early case for
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defense of RSE. It argues that a right to a safe environment - defined
narrowly - is a genuine human right because it passes appropriate justifica-
tory tests. Part I defends the modest use of the language of rights in
expressing environmental norms. Part II offers a narrow account of the scope
of RSE. Part III provides a justification for RSE as conceived in part II. 4
I. SHOULD ENVIRONMENTALISTS USE RIGHTS LANGUAGE?
Considerable controversy exists at present about how widely the language
of rights should be used in expressing environmental values and norms.
Enthusiasts are willing to use rights language in virtually all areas of environ-
mentalism, including biotic rights, rights of species, and animal rights. By
contrast, deep ecologists and non-anthropocentrists often hold that discussion
in the environmental area should totally avoid the language of rights and the
legalisms that allegedly accompany it.'
This paper supports neither of these extreme positions. Rights should not
be the dominant normative concept of environmentalism. It is better to phrase
most environmental discourse in terms of environmental goods, of respect for
and responsibilities towards nature, and of obligations to future generations.
However, speaking of rights is plausible and useful for dealing with some of
the most serious human consequences of environmental degradation. In
particular, the right to a safe environment can play a useful and justifiable role
in protecting human interests in a safe environment and in providing a link
between the environmental and human rights movements.
If the language of rights is used loosely in environmental discourse, people
may begin to claim rights that are excessively metaphorical and rhetorical.
Conversely, if the language of rights is used strictly, people may develop
environmental 2escriptions that are excessively rigid and that preclude
tradeoffs necessary for providing for human needs while trying to work out
environmental rights in W. PAUL GORMLEY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1976). More
recently, Joseph L. Sax offered a cogent defense of RSE in Joseph L. Sax, The Searchfor Environmental
Rights, 6 J. LAND USE & ENvrL. L. 93 (1990). Melissa Thorme surveyed a variety of possible grounds
for environmental rights. Thorme, supra note 1, at 317-31. Edith Brown Weiss briefly reviewed views
on RSE in WEISS, supra note 2, at 114 (1989). I know of no systematic criticism of RSE as a human right,
although Philip Alston cautions against creating new rights in Philip Alston, Conjuring Up New Human
Rights. A Proposal for Quality Control, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 607 (1984). P.H. Kooijmans criticizes the
"third generation" of human rights, with a few references to RSE, in P.H. Kooijmans, Human Rights -
Universal Panacea?, 37 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 315 (1990). Holmes Rolston, III, offers a qualified
endorsement of a "right to a quality environment" in Holmes Rolston, III, Rights and Responsibilities on
the Home Planet, in this issue 251, 262.
4. Thisjustification relies substantially on the framework for justifying human rights developed in this
author's earlier works. See, e.g., JAMES W. NICKEL, MAKING SENSE OF HUMAN RiGaHS (1987).
5. For non-anthropocentric approaches to environmental ethics, see, e.g., J. BAIRD CALLICOTr, IN
DEFENSE OF THE LAND ETHIC: ESSAYS IN ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY (1989); HOLMES ROLSTON, III,
PHILOSOPHY GONE WILD (1986); CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, EARTH AND OTHER ETHICS: THE CASE FOR
MORAL PLURALiSM (1987); and PAUL W. TAYLOR, RESPECT FOR NATURE (1986).
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today's environmental and population crises. Rights claims are not completely
immune to tradeoffs, but the language of rights does imply the restriction of
tradeoffs; thus, rights language should be used sparingly in a field in which
tradeoffs are a necessary part of progress.
On the other hand, entirely avoiding the language of rights in the environ-
mental area would needlessly abandon a valuable normative asset. When used
to claim a safe environment for humans, the language of rights can be used
without being either too metaphorical or engendering worries of excessive
rigidity.
RSE is human oriented. It does, not speak directly to issues such as
biodiversity, the claims of animals, conservation, or sustainable development.
However, the fact that a norm does not apply to all subfields is not a
significant objection if it can be supplemented by other norms that will address
other issues. Nor does the premise that humanity should protect valuable
things other than humans imply that human ethics should neglect to protect
humans. The approach in this paper is accommodationist: RSE is presented
as one useful part of the normative repertory of environmentalism. It can play
a central role in justifying and guiding a wide range of environmental
programs and regulations, but it should do this in concert with other
environmental norms.
RSE is particularly useful because it links the environmental movement to
the international human rights movement; thus, RSE allows environmentalists
to appeal to traditional human rights norms and to use the institutions and
mechanisms developed to promote and implement human rights at the
international level.6 The human rights movement has strong international
recognition, support, and institutions and thus has valuable resources to offer
environmentalism. Therefore, it is worthwhile to associate at least one norm
pertaining to environmental protection with internationally recognized human
rights standards. This is not to say, however, that RSE is justified solely on
the instrumental grounds that it will be useful to environmentalists. In fact
RSE will only prove useful to environmentalists if people find plausible the
claim that it is a genuine human right. As a norm that satisfies the tests
appropriate to human rights,7 RSE should be recognized both as a general
human right and as an important footing for environmental claims.
6. This is not meant to suggest that traditional human rights have no relevance to environmental
concerns. They obviously do. Rights to life and property clearly protect people against some kinds of
environmental abuses. Rights of political participation empower people who would take political action
on behalf of the environment. Rights against murder, torture, and arbitrary arrest protect environmental
activists. For a more general treatment of the contributions that the human rights and environmental move-
ments can make to each other, see James W. Nickel & Eduardo Viola, Integrating Environmentalism and
Human Rights: Lessons from Brazil (Oct. 13, 1992) (unpublished essay, on file with author).
7. See infra text at note 21. On the distinctive features of the concept of a right, see NICKEL, supra
note 4, at 15-26.
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1. THE SCOPE OF THE RIGHT TO A SAFE ENVIRONMENT
There are many possible formulations of environmental rights. For
example, Melissa Thorme writes of "environment as a human right," but
makes clear that she means a right to "a safe, healthy, and ecologically-
balanced environment. ' Many national constitutions use similar language.
The Constitution of Honduras speaks of maintaining "a satisfactory envi-
ronment for the protection of everyone's health."9 The Constitution of South
Korea declares a right "to a healthy and pleasant environment. "10 The
Constitution of Portugal speaks of a "healthy and ecologically balanced
environment."11 The current buzzword, "sustainable," might also be added
to these formulations. If one puts all these phrases together one would end up
with a right to a safe, healthy, pleasant, ecologically balanced, and sustainable
environment.
Although such a broad formulation of RSE sets out an attractive goal, a
narrow formulation focusing exclusively on human health and safety has the
best chance of gaining acceptance as a genuine human right. This paper
therefore concentrates exclusively on just such a narrow formulation. This
paper will speak of a right to a safe environment, meaning an environment
that is not destructive of human health. Defining the scope of this right is best
done in two steps. The first step describes the state of affairs that would exist
if RSE were fully realized. The second step describes the duties that
individuals, governments, corporations and international organizations must
bear in order to realize this state of affairs.
A. The State of Affairs that the Right to a Safe Environment Prescribes
The meaning of "safe environment" is ambiguous, since this term may
refer to freedom from threats of crime or from threats of pollution. For
example, children have a right to a safe environment in school, meaning that
schools should be free from crime and violence. Because RSE does not
address crime or violence, it is important to realize that RSE is concerned
only with a particular set of threats to human safety, namely those which stem
from technological and industrial processes and the disposal of sewage and
wastes. Broadly speaking, RSE is concerned with safety from contamination
and pollution.
Threats to health are the primary focus of RSE because the most severe
effects of pollution, toxic wastes, and inadequately processed sewage are
8. Thorme, supra note 1, at 310.
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sickness and death. Threats to health include ones that kill, shorten a person's
life, make a person permanently incapable of normal functioning, and make
a person temporarily (and perhaps recurrently) sick. Threats to some non-
health aspects of well-being should also be included in RSE as a secondary
focus. For present purposes, this paper will include only very basic aspects
of well-being in RSE, those that pertain to avoiding extreme misery and to
preserving the possibility of a minimally good life. For example, having to
live with constant loud, screeching noise from a nearby factory might not
destroy one's health, but it would make most people quite miserable. In sum,
RSE should address forms of contamination and pollution that create
significant risks of killing people, making them sick or seriously miserable,
or depriving them of the possibility of a minimally good life.
To define the scope of RSE we must define acceptable levels of risk. This
is a difficult matter. How safe must the environment be? The total elimination
of risks is impossible, and using all available means to diminish risk is not
affordable, given other important claims on resources, such as education,
medical care, employment opportunities, and security against crime. A better
approach is to specify that the environment, or the level of safety from
environmental risks, should be satisfactory or adequate for health. These
phrases, although vague, clearly set the level of acceptable risk at an
intermediate level, and thus make it more likely that RSE can pass the
feasibility test discussed below. On the other hand, they do not set the risk
standard so low as to make RSE meaningless.
The fact that terms such as "satisfactory" and "adequate" are vague is not
a significant problem in this context. Even if it were possible to give a more
precise description of the level of acceptable risk, it probably would be
inappropriate for international institutions to prescribe a single, precise
standard worldwide. International human rights typically set broad normative
standards that can be interpreted and applied by appropriate legislative,
judicial, or administrative bodies at the national level. Consider, for example
the broad normative standards set forth by the rights regarding inhumane or
degrading punishment, effective remedy and arbitrary arrest or detention. The
proposed standard of "adequate for health and well-being" fits this pattern. It
provides a general, imprecise description of the level of protections against
environmental risks that States should guarantee. Risk standards should be
specified further at the national level through democratic legislative and
regulatory processes, in light of current scientific knowledge and fiscal
realities.12
12. See NICKEL, supra note 4, at 61-81 (addressing issue of adapting international standards to the
cultures and institutions of particular countries); Sax, supra note 3, at 96, (discussing democratic values
in relation to environmental rights and arguing that acceptable level of environmental risk should be
decided through open process of democratic decision-making).
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B. Duties Generated by the Right to a Safe Environment
A right is not merely a claim to some freedom or benefit; it is also a claim
against certain parties to act so as to make that freedom or benefit available.
The following sections consider the duties generated by RSE.
1. Duties of Individuals and Corporations
Persons, organizations, and corporations have a duty to refrain from
activities that generate unacceptable levels of environmental risk. For
example, individuals have a duty to refrain from pouring dangerous chemicals
into sewers or waterways, to refrain from deactivating pollution control
devices on their cars, and to refrain from avoidable car use on days when
pollution alerts are in effect. Hospitals have a duty to dispose of medical
wastes in ways that avoid risks of contamination and other injuries. Compa-
nies that transport oil and other hazardous material have a duty to take strong
precautions against spills and other accidents. When environmental damage
occurs, individuals, organizations, and corporations have a duty to restore the
environment and compensate victims. 13
2. Duties of Governments
Like individuals and corporations, governments have negative duties to
refrain from actions that generate large risks of damage to human life and
health. For example, governments have a duty not to operate nuclear power
plants without taking adequate measures to ensure safe design, construction,
maintenance, operations, and waste disposal. Beyond these negative duties,
governments also have a duty to protect the inhabitants of their territories
against environmental risks generated by either governmental or private
agencies. In our technologically advanced civilization, an effective system of
environmental protection requires a governmentally-enacted system of
environmental regulation that sets safety standards for thousands of processes
and substances. This system must encourage or pressure those using these
processes and substances to comply with its regulations, and impose
significant penalties on those who fail to comply. An adequate system of
environmental regulation also requires that citizens, environmental organiza-
13. Participation in an activity such as driving an automobile may imply that one has assumed the
risks of that activity, including risks from automobile-created air pollution, and hence that one is not
entitled to compensation, or full compensation, for harms resulting from this pollution. Accepting this
proposition does not, however, make RSE meaningless in the area of air pollution because many people
- particularly children - have not chosen to use automobiles, and because others do so only for lack of
other alternatives.
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tions, and government agencies have the power to sue polluters, whether
public or private, for compensatory damages.
Contemporary human rights documents require that governments be
elected in periodic, free elections, and that all citizens be free to participate
in politics by expressing their opinions, by voting, by campaigning, and by
running for office. These rights to political participation reinforce the scope
of RSE by requiring democratic participation in decisions about environmental
risks. For such participation to be meaningful, the public must have access to
information about the risks posed by the actions of governmental and private
enterprises.
3. Duties of International Organizations
International agencies such as the United Nations and the Organization of
American States have negative duties to refrain from generating large
environmental risks. For example, the United Nations has a duty to ensure
environmental safety when using military forces to conduct peacekeeping
operations. The World Bank has a negative duty to refrain from loaning
money to development projects that will generate major risks to human health
and safety. These international organizations also have positive duties to
promote and protect RSE through declarations, regulations, and enforcement
measures. RSE should be added to international human rights conventions
such as the European Convention on Human Rights"4 and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 5 RSE is already
included in the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 6 and will
be included in the American Convention on Human Rights 7 when the
Protocol of San Salvador comes into force.'" These conventions are
implemented at the international level through periodic government reports on
their progress to human rights agencies; complaints brought by individuals and
States against violating States in human rights tribunals; mediation of
complaints by standing human rights commissions; adjudication of disputes
over the interpretation of key clauses by international judicial bodies; the
publication of reports of violations; and the use of diplomatic, political, and
economic pressure to coerce violators to comply. 19
14. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 221.
15. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S.
3, 6 I.L.M. 360 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).
16. OAU Doc. CABILEGI67I31rev.5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986).
17. O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEAISer.L./V/ii.23, doec. 21, rev. 6 (1979) (entered into force July 18, 1978).
18. Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights, Nov. 14, 1988, O.A.S. T.S. No. 69, 28 I.L.M. 156 (1989) (Protocol of San
Salvador).
19. Not all of these measures are used by each of the conventions mentioned. For a thorough
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II. THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE RIGHT TO A SAFE ENVIRONMENT
Human rights are fundamental international moral and legal norms which
protect people - simply as people, and not in virtue of citizenship or
allegiance - from severe but common social, political, and legal abuses.
These rights may not effectively prevent these abuses until the rights are both
widely accepted and legally implemented at the international and national
levels. Nevertheless, rights exist independently of such acceptance.
To qualify as a human right, RSE must satisfy at least four criteria.2"
First, proponents must demonstrate that the proposed rightholders have a
strong claim to the liberty, protection, or benefit in question by showing that
this liberty, protection, or benefit is of great value to individuals and society,
and by showing that these values are frequently threatened by social and
political abuses. Second, they must show that this claim cannot be adequately
satisfied unless we grant people rights rather than weaker forms of protection.
Rights are powerful and demanding norms that should only be used to
formulate moral claims when weaker norms are inadequate. Third, proponents
must demonstrate that the proposed addressees, the parties that bear duties
under the right, can legitimately be subjected to the negative and positive
duties required for compliance with and implementation of the right. Finally,
the proposed right must be feasible given current institutional and economic
resources. 2' RSE satisfies each of these four criteria.
A. Are Fundamental Interests Threatened?
The specific rights included in the historic bills of rights were chosen in
response to perceived abuses by governments. Indeed, the texts of some bills
of rights actually begin with a list of complaints against the previous govern-
ment.' The right to a fair trial, for example, is a response to the fact that
governments have often used the legal system to disadvantage, imprison, and
discussion of how environmental rights could be implemented internationally, see Thorme, supra note 1,
at 335-41.
20. The steps for justifying a specific right presented here are the second stage of the justification of
rights. The first stage provides broad normative foundations for human rights. In NICKEL, supra note 4,
at 82-100, this author suggests that rights are justified for prudential reasons (rights protect one's
fundamental interests), and moral reasons (rights secure claims to life, liberty, and fairness).
21. See id. at 107-19 for a discussion of how to evaluate the feasibility of a specific right.
22. A long list of abuses is implicit in the Magna Carta (1215) (for example, item 38: "No bailiff for
the future shall put any man to his 'law' upon his own mere words of mouth, without credible witnesses
brought for this purpose."). The English Bill of Rights (1689) begins with an explicit list of twelve
complaints against King James II (for example, item 9: "partial, corrupt, and unqualified persons have
been returned and served on juries in trials"). The U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights respond to a list
of complaints against the British King enumerated in the Declaration of Independence (1776). These
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kill political opponents. This linkage between abuses and specific rights
suggests that rights can be selected partially on the basis of the specific kinds
of abuses occurring at a particular time and place. This general idea can be
applied to environmental issues by asking which environmental abuses
frequently lead to substantial human harm.
Technological development and population growth have both contributed
to the creation of major environmental threats to human health and well-being.
Imagine a town and surrounding region that have become the location of a
large, dirty, toxic industry governed by no significant pollution controls.'
Imagine that air, water, and noise pollution are severe, that few measures are
taken to insulate residents of the town from pollutants, and that these
pollutants have significant toxicity.
The costs to the health and welfare of people in this town will be large.
Rates of miscarriage and birth defects will be substantially higher than
normal; children's growth and intelligence will be stunted. People will suffer
from higher than normal rates of allergies, respiratory problems, skin
diseases, cancer, and premature death. Contamination of foodstuffs and
reduced plant growth will hinder food production. Fishing and animal
husbandry production will decrease as animals suffer the same health
problems as humans. Nearby areas of natural beauty will be destroyed and
made useless for recreation. Cases of this sort are likely to have an equity
dimension as well because the poorest members of the population will live
closest to the pollution source and will have the least ability to escape its
effects.
When environmental problems reach this level of severity - as they have
in many parts of the world - the health and welfare of many people clearly
are suffering substantial damage. Few human rights violations other than
programs of mass extermination cause such widespread and large scale
damage to the health and welfare of a community.
Consider next a milder case with less severe air and water pollution. Air
pollution of the sort one finds in cities such as Sao Paulo, Mexico City,24
and Los Angeles causes substantial damage to people's health. This is not to
say, of course, that every person living in these cities is injured, or suffers a
shortened lifespan. Nevertheless, elevated rates of cancer seem to be present
23. Prior to recent clean-up efforts, Cubatao, Brazil had similar environmental problems. On Cubatao,
see Dahlia M. Spektor et al., Effects of Heavy Industrial Pollution in Respiratory Function in the Children
of Cubatao, Brazil, 94 ENvTL. HEALTH PERsP. 51 (1991). Many more towns with such problems are
found in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. On the severity of contamination in Eastern Europe,
see Hilary F. French, Industrial Wasteland, WORLD WATCH, Nov.-Dec. 1988, at 21.
24. On Sao Paulo and Mexico City, see Isabelle Romieu et al., Urban Air Pollution in Latin America
and the Caribbean, 41 J. AIR & WASTE MGMT. Ass'N 1166 (1991) (stating that inhabitants of these cities
are exposed to air pollution levels that exceed World Health Organization guidelines for adequate health
protection).
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in cities such as Los Angeles,' and greater than normal numbers of people
in such cities suffer from asthma and allergies. Estimates of the consequences
of air pollution on life and health in the Los Angeles basin have produced
astoundingly high figures. A recent study suggested that attaining the national
clean air standard for particulate matter in the Los Angeles Basin would
prevent approximately 1600 premature deaths each year.26 The risk of
premature death due to elevated particulate matter levels is 1 in 10,000 per
year greater than if the federal standard were reached, and is equivalent to
half the annual risk of death in a car accident.27 This study also estimated the
annual mortality and morbidity costs of exceeding the federal standards for
ozone and particulate matter as nearly $10 billion.28 These significant health
risks and costs, imposed on those who are not profiting from the generation
of pollution, justify imposing RSE in order to help achieve a safer environ-
ment.
The justification of a human right not only needs to identify abuses, but
also needs to show that these abuses frustrate fundamental human interests.
As Maurice Cranston observed, a human right protects an interest or value
that is of "paramount importance."" Thus, the critical question about severe
pollution is whether it threatens interests of paramount importance. If the only
effect of severe air pollution were a slight dullness in the color of some
people's hair, the interest at stake - having glossy hair - would be too slight
to provide the foundation for a human right. Obviously, however, the effects
of severe pollution are not trivial. Severe air pollution kills some people,
shortens the lives of others, and makes still others recurrently sick. These
interests in life, health, and a minimal level of welfare are already protected
by a number of human rights, such as rights against murder, torture, or
physical injury. Severe pollution is a significant and frequent threat to the
fundamental interests that human rights protect; the right to a safe environ-
ment aims to protect people against severe pollution and its consequences, and
should therefore be accorded a position equal to other human rights that seek
to prevent these consequences.
25. See Paul K. Mills et al., Ambient Air Pollution and Cancer in California Seventh-day Adventists,
46 ARcHiE OF ENVTL. HEALTH, Sept.-Oct. 1991, at 271.
26. Jane V. Hall et al., Valuing the Health Benefits of Clean Air, 255 SCIENCE 812, 812 (1992); see
also Robert Read & Cathy Read, Breathing Can Be Hazardous to Your Health, NEW ScIENTIST, Feb.
1991, at 34 (urban air poses deadly dangers in spite of environmental regulations).
27. Hall, supra note 26, at 812.
28. Id
29. MAURICE CRANSTON, WHAT ARE HUN RIGHTS? 67 (1973). For example, justification of the
right against torture emphasizes that torture imposes severe pain and suffering, threatens physical and
mental health, and is an extreme form of coercion. See NICKEL, supra note 4, at 110; see also Henry
Shue, Torture, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 124 (1978).
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B. Does Environmental Safety Require Environmental Rights?
After a proposed right passes the test described above, there is clearly a
claim to some sort of social action. However, the interests in question might
be adequately protected by norms weaker than rights. For example, charitable
assistance or structural changes might eliminate the threats.30 In order to
justify a right such as the right to a fair trial, proponents must articulate why
the danger of unfairness in criminal trials cannot be eliminated by general
improvements in legal processes, by self-help on the part of the accused, or
by charitable assistance from the community. Proponents must demonstrate
that only high-priority, effectively enforced and administered legal rights to
a fair trial can provide adequate protection. Analogously, RSE can only be
justified as a human right if measures weaker than declaring a right to a safe
environment will not provide adequate protection against pollution and
contamination.
If large parts of the population could be drawn into a "deep" rather than
"shallow" environmental movement, a major re-evaluation of industrial,
consumer society might occur. A successful re-evaluation might make it
unnecessary to formulate and seek enactment of environmental rights.
Giagnocavo and Goldstein argue against articulating environmental rights
because such rights are "predicated on violence and separation" from the
environment and "shatter" the appropriate relation to it. They advocate
"developing an ecological consciousness" rather than perpetuating the status
quo "in the guise of environmental rights and environmental 'legal' re-
form. "31
Although this author strongly endorses the development of widespread
ecological consciousness, he doubts that this development -- if it occurred -
would make environmental rights unnecessary. The hope that ecological
consciousness can make environmental rights and law unnecessary is an
example of the threat-elimination strategy.32 This suggests that if people had
the right sort of ecological consciousness, they would not willingly pollute and
contaminate the environment, and that if threats of pollution were eliminated
or greatly reduced, there would be no need for environmental rights.
The human population, or even a significant part of it, will not soon
develop a worldwide environmental consciousness. Even if a worldwide
revolution in environmental attitudes did occur and people were reasonably
well motivated to act on those new attitudes, many environmental problems
30. On weaker alternatives to rights such as self-help, social aid, abundance strategy, and threat-
elimination strategy, see NICKEL, supra note 4, at 113-17.
31. Cynthia Giagnocavo & Howard Goldstein, Law Reform or World Re-form: The Problem of
Environmental Rights, 35 MCGiLL L.J. 345, 373-74 (1990).
32. See NICKEL, supra note 4, at 116-17.
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would remain because of the need to use dangerous industrial and agricultural
processes to support the large populations that now exist. The approach
represented by Giagnocavo and Goldstein overemphasizes the importance of
good motivation and underestimates the importance of population size and the
extent of the world's dependence on hazardous technological processes.
Many people who have tried to live a more environmentally sound lifestyle
have found that they cannot avoid engaging in activities that cause significant
pollution. They need an automobile to get to work in a reasonable amount of
time. They rely on advanced technologies that create numerous environmental
risks. They are part of a large, concentrated human population that requires
large amounts of water and energy and generates large amounts of sewage and
wastes. Furthermore, powerful economic interests, including people's interests
in having jobs for themselves and their children, often work against requiring
polluters to reform their practices. Consequently, although policy-makers
should support strategies to promote environmental threat-elimination or
reduction, society will continue to benefit from RSE until such threat-
elimination strategies have been totally successful. 3
C. The Duties of Addressees
Effective rights protect or empower rightholders by imposing moral or
legal burdens on other parties, the addressees. Proponents of RSE must show
not only that the rightholders have a strong case for desiring some freedom,
protection, or benefit, but also that the burden of providing this freedom,
protection, or benefit can be legitimately imposed on the addressees.3 4
As noted above, individuals, organizations, and corporations have negative
duties to refrain from activities that create substantial threats to a safe
environment. Governments and international organizations may also have
positive duties to promote and protect a safe environment. Those who engage
in and profit from activities which damage the environment should bear the
burden of regulations which demand restraint and compensation.
33. In addition, RSE can play a useful role in the consciousness-raising process itself. A
consciousness-raising approach involves putting forward an attractive perspective or agenda and supporting
reasons for its adoption; encouraging people to examine their attitudes, habits, stereotypes, and actions;
persuading political figures and celebrities to promote the perspective or agenda domestically and
internationally; getting domestic and foreign press to cover the issues identified in the agenda; creating
organizations to promote the perspective and agenda through discussions, lobbying, and publicity; and
implementing educational programs at all levels. See IRIS M. YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF
DIFFERENCE 153-54 (1990). Adding the resources of the human rights movement to a consciousness-
raising process requires incorporating key elements of the environmental agenda in human rights
documents and norms in order to promote the agenda and give it credibility; having access to the resources
of human rights organizations to promote the agenda; and using the enforcement mechanisms developed
to promote human rights at the international level and constitutional rights at the national level.
34. For a fuller discussion of the topics in this section and the next, see James W. Nickel, How
Human Rights Generate Duties to Protect and Provide, 15 HUM. RTs. Q. 77 (1993).
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One interesting aspect of environmental risks and harms is that they often
result from activities engaged in by many people, such as driving on Los
Angeles freeways. These activities produce risks or harms as a result of the
cumulative effect of individual decisions made by thousands or millions of
people, but would not produce risks or harms if done by only a few people.
Most human rights violations do not result from the combined actions of
thousands or millions of persons, but violations of RSE sometimes take this
form. Because putting a small amount of automobile exhaust into the air
would be permissible if nobody else did so, and because no malice is
involved, it may seem strange to regard driving a car as a human rights
violation. Consider, however, that collective action may inadvertently bring
on a variety of human deprivations (rights violations without a direct actor),
including starvation and malnutrition.35 Moreover, not all violations of
traditional human rights are intentional and malicious; for example, a person's
right to a fair trial can be violated by a judge's negligence or incompetence
rather than his malice.
In order to prevent the widespread violation of RSE, each individual must
change his behavior. In regard to automobile pollution, each person has a duty
not to deactivate pollution control devices on her car and to comply with
collective measures to diminish pollution, such as abiding by no drive days
and using alternative transportation systems. Beyond this, each citizen has a
duty to promote and support measures to improve pollution controls on
automobiles, to create effective schemes to diminish automobile use, and to
limit her own driving, particularly during periods of high pollution.
D. Feasibility
Although RSE is supported by important moral considerations, RSE could
fail to be a fully-justified human right if its costs were excessively burden-
some. Costs play this powerful normative role in the justification of RSE and
other rights for two reasons.3 6 First, there are limits to the moral and legal
duties that we can legitimately impose on each other,37 and costs help us
decide whether these limits are being exceeded. Second, given limited
resources, the cost of complying with and implementing one right may make
it impossible to comply with and implement other important rights. Rights are
not magical sources of supply. Their normative power is insufficient to
automatically call into being the human, institutional, and financial resources
35. See HENRY SHuE, BASIC RIGHTS 42-46 (1980).
36. For a more complete discussion of costs in relation to human rights, see NICKEL, supra note 4,
at 120-30.
37. See generally JAMES S. RISHKIN, THE LIMITS OF OBLIGATION (1982); SHELLY KAGAN, THE
LIMrrs OF MORALITY 386-403 (1989) (countenancing heavier moral burdens than does Fishkin).
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needed for implementation. The obligations flowing from rights will be
without effect if addressees are genuinely unable to comply with them, or if
they are unable to comply while meeting other obligations.
This is not to say that human rights stand or fall with their cost-benefit
ratios. The underlying moral claim does not stand or fall with its affordability,
but the policy choice of recognizing this claim as one that must be fully
satisfied here and now does depend on whether doing so is affordable. To
illustrate this test, consider once more the right to a fair trial. Trials, and
particularly fair ones, are an expensive way to administer the criminal law.
They require a standing system of courts, judges, prosecutors, defense
attorneys, and other legal officials. Nevertheless, the costs of creating, using,
and maintaining this system are not so high as to make it unfeasible for
countries to comply with this right. Countries around the globe at varying
levels of economic development manage to run criminal justice systems that
mostly comply with the right to a fair trial. Consider another example. One
important, if not conclusive, objection to a right to medical care is that
meeting all legitimate medical needs with an adequate quality of care is
unaffordable, even for rich countries. Medical needs, this objection alleges,
are a bottomless pit. The question therefore arises of whether RSE more
closely resembles the attainable right to a fair trial or an unqualified right to
the satisfaction of medical needs.
Effectively regulating pollution and contamination, like meeting all medical
needs, may seem like a bottomless pit. Regulation requires standard setting,
promulgation, and enforcement. These activities require expensive, highly-
educated personnel, such as scientists and lawyers& Pollution control often
requires complicated technological systems and elaborate disposal processes.
Nevertheless, numerous countries already have extensive experience with
implementing constitutional or legislatively enacted RSEs; thus far, these
programs have not proven so costly as to undermine economies or bankrupt
governments because the standards they are designed to enforce were chosen
with an eye toward costs. As these experiences suggest, one reason for setting
the standard of protection prescribed by RSE at an adequate rather than
optimal level is to keep pollution control affordable."8 Furthermore, the
resources saved by preventing losses to health, life, property, and agricultural
production can help finance RSE. 9
Some third world countries may find it difficult to marshall the human,
38. On the relations between standard setting, costs, and enforcement, see Mark Sagoff, The
Principles of Federal Pollution Control Law, 71 MINN. L. REV. 19, 80-90 (1986).
39. It is possible, of course, that some global environmental problems such as ozone depletion or
climate change will require enormously expensive programs to overcome their threat to human survival
and health. The scope and costs of these problems are subject to considerable debate. Thus, the
affordability of and scope of RSE may have to be reconsidered when these matters are better understood.
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institutional, and financial resources needed to create a meaningful system of
environmental protection. However, three factors lessen the burden which
RSE imposes on less-developed countries. First, poor countries have
considerable discretion to give less demanding definitions to the notion of an
adequate level of environmental safety through their own legislative and
judicial processes. Less demanding definitions of adequacy will make RSE
less expensive to implement. This discretion is not unique to RSE; most
human rights contain vague key phrases that give countries discretion to
interpret the right in ways that make it less costly to enforce. Discretion
therefore provides a way of indexing the cost of human rights to a country's
level of development. Scrutiny by international organizations makes this
discretion less dangerous. Second, the amount of technology and industry in
a society and the size of its pollution problems are roughly proportional. The
countries with the greatest potential for pollution and contamination are also
the most highly industrialized, and hence are better able to pay the costs of
regulation and control. Brazil, for example, is generally much more polluted
than Bolivia, but it also has an immensely greater ability to pay for pollution
control. Finally, rich countries have a responsibility to assist poor countries
in controlling serious pollution problems through measures such as technology
transfer, technical assistance, loans, and grants.
IV. CONCLUSION
A strong case exists for RSE. When defined narrowly, it has an intelligible
scope. If a right with this scope were effectively implemented at the
international and national levels, it would protect human beings against
substantial and recurrent threats. Weaker forms of promoting pollution control
are inadequate. Therefore, a strong, enforceable right is needed. RSE has
identifiable addressees who can legitimately bear the normative burdens
associated with this right. Finally, RSE is feasible to implement in most parts
of the world. The costs of effectively regulating pollution are substantial, and
many countries will face difficulties in marshalling the resources needed for
this task. In this respect, however, RSE is no different from other human
rights.

